WASHINGTON, DC: Today the U.S. House of Representatives passed a landmark bill to close significant loopholes in our nation’s homeland security systems that included two key measures authored by Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-MA), a senior member of the House Homeland Security Committee. The provisions included in H.R. 1, the bill to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations, on screening 100% of air cargo shipped on passenger planes and screening all ship containers before they reach U.S. ports were longstanding Markey initiatives that he has fought for over the last four years by introducing legislation and offering amendments on many occasions.
“The vulnerability of both air and maritime cargo to terrorist attack is well known,” said Rep. Markey. “Most of the 6 billion pounds of cargo carried on passenger planes every year is loaded onboard without being scanned for liquid, plastic, or conventional explosives. And most of the maritime cargo containers bound for the U.S. are not scanned for nuclear bombs before being loaded onto ships. We know that such unscanned cargo is a serious security weakness. Today Democrats are putting forward a new air cargo and port security policy that reflects the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and requires all cargo on passenger planes and all containers entering our ports to be scanned.”
The bill, H.R. 1, includes a number of other provisions which include: • implementing 100% screening of air cargo, •implementing 100% screening of cargo coming in to U.S. ports, •providing fairer funding for first responders in the most targeted communities, •preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and •expanding the U.S.’s diplomatic outreach. The cargo screening measures have been opposed by the Bush Administration and the shipping industries on a number of false premises. Below is a fact sheet that will dispel many of the arguments made by those parties: AIR AND MARITIME CARGO SCREENING MYTH VERSUS REALITY AIR CARGO MYTH: No available technology. Currently, there is no available technology to effectively and efficiently screen cargo. A risk-based system that targets high risk shipments for additional screening is the best approach. REALITY: This is a red herring repeated over and over again despite facts to the contrary. Three years ago, a representative from Boeing testified at a hearing held by the House Select Committee on Homeland Security. Boeing told the Committee that the technology to screen 100% of cargo transported on passenger planes not only exists, but it’s ready to be deployed. Specifically, in response to my question about the ability to screen all cargo loaded aboard passenger planes, the representative from Boeing told me: •“I certainly believe that the technology is available.” He continued: “There are a number of companies that have technology [for screening cargo]. As you may be aware, the systems deployed today are made by InVision and L3, but we are evaluating and working with the Transportation Security Administration, looking at some 30 other companies that are offering technology that not only meet the current standard but could potentially enhance it.” •In May 2005, one of these technology companies (Rapiscan) wrote to Rep. Markey and stated that “The question of the availability of technology to inspect air cargo has already been answered. Included in our portfolio of systems is an air cargo inspection system that can inspect fully-loaded cargo containers.” MYTH: 100 percent cargo screening is operationally impractical. REALITY: This argument was also made during the debate over passenger baggage screening and was shown to be false. TSA estimates that about 40 percent of cargo carried on passenger planes is individual boxes, not pallets of boxes wrapped together. Much of this cargo could be scanned using the Explosive Detection System (EDS) machines currently used for checked baggage. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, passengers’ checked bags were not physically screened; but after 9/11, we decided such screening was required to strengthen homeland security. We now screen 100% of passengers’ checked baggage before it’s loaded onboard –cargo placed on the very same passenger airline also should be physically inspected. MYTH: Screening every piece of cargo would destroy the passenger airline industry. Imposing a requirement to screen every piece of air cargo carried on passenger airlines would undermine the viability of passenger air service, dramatically increase costs of air cargo, eliminate cargo services to some communities and impose major time and economic disruptions on many major U.S. industries. REALITY: Once again, this argument was made and refuted when 100% screening of passengers’ checked baggage was debated. After September 11, the aviation industry made the same types of arguments against screening 100% of passengers’ checked bags. Congress and the American public decided that these arguments didn’t hold water, and that security imperatives required such screening. The same is true for cargo placed on passenger planes. MYTH: The Known Shipper program is enough to assure the security of cargo. REALITY: The Known Shipper program is a dangerously flawed and easily exploitable program. In fact, in September 2003 an employee of a Known Shipper exploited the program to ship himself from New York to Texas! GAO has reported that TSA only has information on less than one-third of the estimated 1.5 million known shippers in business today. [“Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security”, GAO-06-76, October 2005]. Here’s what some security experts have said about the Known Shipper Program: “It is pointless to require air passengers to wait in security lines if we then allow packages to go on flights with no inspection whatsoever. Look, we’re going to pretend to say there’s security inspections in place, but is that security protection equal to the rigorous protections that people go through? No, not even close. First you have to define a known shipper. By definition, that’s somebody you’ve met, not somebody you’ve known. If (the company has an office), seven days from now, we can move their freight. I only have to verify that you are in fact a business and by doing a secondary verification by a credit report or checking the phone book.” - Bob Masters, senior vice president of Manna Freight Systems Inc., Mendota Heights (from Minneapolis-St. Paul Business Journal, “Is Air Cargo Secure Enough?, December 23, 2002) MYTH: Screening all cargo on passenger planes would be too costly. REALITY: The federal government has spent about $3.5 billion since the September 11th attacks to purchase and install equipment to scan all checked bags. Some of this investment can be leveraged to screen cargo. Moreover, it makes no sense to invest billions to screen passengers’ bags while the cargo in the very same cargo bay as these bags is not screened at all! The cargo screening provision calls for the same level of scrutiny for cargo on passenger planes as is applied to passengers’ checked bags transported on the very same planes. The security screening fee that passengers pay on each airline ticket they buy - $2.50 for a one-way ticket and $5 per roundtrip – has been reinstated. This fee helps to cover the cost of screening passengers’ checked bags. Passengers are willing to pay a small additional fee to improve security. Likewise, shippers should pay a modest screening fee make sure that their cargo going on passenger planes is safe. TSA and CRS have estimated that the cost of screening all cargo on passenger planes would be about $360 million per year – this is a reasonable sum, particularly given the costs associated with a successful terrorist attack and the risk of exploitation of this glaring loophole. Closing the cargo loophole is not a matter of money, but a matter of priorities and a matter of will. After September 11th, we decided to require 100% screening of passenger baggage. At the time, opponents said it would cost too much and bring air travel to a grinding halt – making many of the same arguments that we’ve heard about 100% screening of cargo. MARITIME CARGO MYTH: We do not have the technology to scan every container overseas. REALITY: We have the technology to accomplish 100 percent scanning overseas, according to technology vendors who already manufacture and deploy it and port operators such as DP World, which is building in the capability to scan all containers in designs of its port terminals. Moreover, DHS just announced that 100% scanning would be occurring at several large overseas ports as part of the requirements of the SAFE Port Act. DHS clearly believes that the technology exists to accomplish these pilot programs. Last year, a demonstration project that operated at marine terminals in Hong Kong, one of the world’s busiest ports, demonstrated that 100 percent scanning can be accomplished effectively and efficiently. In Hong Kong, every container passed through a gamma-ray content-scanning machine and a radiation portal to record levels of radioactivity within the container. Companies such as Rapiscan Systems already deploy non-intrusive scanning systems at seaports. Rapiscan Systems is a wholly-owned subsidiary of OSI Systems and is headquartered in Hawthorne, California with additional offices and manufacturing in Finland, India, Malaysia, Singapore, United Kingdom and the United States. Rapiscan currently deploys 50,000 scanning systems in more than 100 countries around the world. According to the company “The question of the availability of technology to inspect cargo containers both before and after they enter the U.S. already has been answered.” [Source: Letter to Congressman Markey, May 3, 2006.] Moreover, last month, the DHS announced the Secure Freight Initiative, a pilot program that implements a provision in the SAFE Port Act and will result in deployment of technology that will scan for radiation and density all U.S.-bound containers. And recently, David Sanborn, DP World Senior Vice President and Managing Director of the Americas called for a universal radiation and imaging scanning initiative at the Maritime Security Council Conference on October 17, 2006. “ . . the SAFE Port Act limits the building of integrated scanning systems to a small pilot program. Is imaging and radiation detection equipment necessary to protect us? If we believe it is, we should agree to do it everywhere and establish the standards and procedures to facilitate it. . . If the best way to reduce risk is to ensure that all containers are scanned, then we should implement a universal radiation and imaging scanning initiative. Some people say this is too ambitious. But we are convinced something can be done, if only there is the collective will to do so, and the universal standards that can galvanize such will into action.” MYTH: Scanning every container would paralyze our economy, bringing commerce to a halt. REALITY: Scanning every container will not “bring commerce to a halt” According to port security expert and former Coast Guard officer Stephen Flynn, the Hong Kong project “is being carried out without impeding the operation of busy marine terminals. It could be put in place in every major container port in the world at a cost of $1.5 billion, or approximately $15 per container.” The total cost of a 100 percent scanning system, including containers with effective tamper-proof seals, would likely reach about $100 per container. [Source: “Port Security Is Still A House of Cards”, Stephen Flynn, Far East Economic Review, January/February 2006]. MYTH: The cost of scanning every container would be exorbitant, making it an impractical security option. FACT: Scanning can be accomplished at a reasonable cost. Moreover, the cost of a successful attack on our ports would be astronomical. As noted above, the cost of scanning every container overseas before arrival at U.S. ports is not substantial. This cost is made even more insignificant when compared to the average $66,000 value of the goods shipped in each container, and compared to the $4000 it costs to ship containers to the U.S. from Asia. Moreover, the cost of a disruption of U.S. port operations if a terrorist attack were successful could reach $58 billion, according to an estimate prepared by Booz-Allen-Hamilton. The 10-day West Coast port lock-out that resulted from a longshoreman strike was estimated to have cost up to $19 billion. Terrorists already have tried to exploit loopholes in port security. On March 14, 2004, two Palestinian suicide bombers were discovered at the Port of Ashdod in Israel, where they had been smuggled in a cargo container outfitted with a secret compartment and a cache of weapons. Although they were intercepted before they reached their intended targets – the port’s fuel and chemical storage tanks - the terrorists killed themselves along with 10 Israelis. Italian authorities arrested a man trying to ship himself from Egypt to Canada inside a cargo container. It was equipped with a makeshift bed and enough food and water for the three-week journey. The stowaway was a trained airplane mechanic and he was carrying a laptop computer, a satellite phone, fake credit cards and an airport security pass. The 9/11 Commission determined that the risk of maritime terrorism is at least as great as, if not greater than, the risk of terrorism involving civilian aviation. MYTH: 100 percent of cargo containers are already screened overseas. REALITY: The “screening” of cargo containers overseas is nothing more than a paperwork check that relies on the descriptions the shippers themselves provide about the contents of their containers. This screening is not the “scanning” that is needed to view the actual contents of the containers and detect any nuclear materials or dangerous materials that may be present. Only screening containers is like only requiring airline passengers to show their identification and tickets at the security checkpoint, without requiring them to walk through the metal detector. MYTH: We already scan almost 100 percent of cargo containers for nuclear materials, and our goal is to get to 100 percent in the next few years. In fact, the SAFE Ports Act mandates the deployment of radiation portal monitors which will cover 98 percent of the containers entering our country and then going out into the country. REALITY: The Bush Administration’s policy goal is to scan 100 percent of cargo containers for nuclear materials after they have arrived in the U.S. This scanning is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Once a nuclear bomb arrives in one of our ports or cities, it is too late. We must detect and deter these weapons overseas, so we don’t have to suffer the deadly consequences here, in our own country. MYTH: The SAFE Port Act requires 100% scanning pilot programs, and the Markey 100% scanning provisions in this bill undermine these ongoing efforts. REALITY: The provisions in this bill in fact require DHS to incorporate all the lessons learned from these pilot programs into its final regulations. We will be building on these ongoing efforts, not undermining them. # # # CONTACT: Israel Klein
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
January 9, 2007
202.225.2836
