

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

To support stability across the Taiwan Strait.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. MARKEY (for himself and Mr. SULLIVAN) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To support stability across the Taiwan Strait.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Actions Sup-
5 porting Security by Undertaking Regular Engagements
6 Act” or the “Taiwan ASSURE Act”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 Congress makes the following findings:

9 (1) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Ini-
10 tiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the
11 United States has grown its strategic partnership

1 with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 peo-
2 ple.

3 (2) Section 2(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act
4 (22 U.S.C. 3301(b)) declares that it is the policy of
5 the United States—

6 (A) “to preserve and promote extensive,
7 close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and
8 other relations between the people of the United
9 States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the
10 people on the China mainland and all other peo-
11 ples of the Western Pacific area”; and

12 (B) “to declare that peace and stability in
13 the [Western Pacific] area are in the political,
14 security, and economic interests of the United
15 States, and are matters of international con-
16 cern”.

17 (3) In recent years, the Government of the Peo-
18 ple’s Republic of China (PRC) has intensified its ef-
19 forts to diplomatically isolate and intimidate Taiwan
20 through—

21 (A) punitive economic measures;

22 (B) increased military provocations; and

23 (C) exertions of malign influence to under-
24 mine democracy in Taiwan.

1 (4) To ensure the durability of the United
2 States policy under the Taiwan Relations Act (Pub-
3 lic Law 115–409), it is necessary—

4 (A) to reinforce—

5 (i) Taiwan’s international participa-
6 tion;

7 (ii) Taiwan’s global economic integra-
8 tion; and

9 (iii) the credibility of Taiwan’s mili-
10 tary deterrent; and

11 (B) to simultaneously take measures to re-
12 duce the risk of miscalculation among the PRC,
13 the United States, and Taiwan.

14 (5) Taiwan’s meaningful participation in inter-
15 national organizations in which statehood is not a
16 requirement benefits the global community, as evi-
17 denced by the fact that Taiwan was the first to in-
18 form the World Health Organization of cases of
19 atypical pneumonia reported in Wuhan, China on
20 December 31, 2019;

21 (6) Despite the COVID–19 pandemic creating
22 an opportunity for the Government of the PRC to
23 launch a disinformation campaign aimed at sowing
24 internal social division and undermining confidence
25 in the response of Taiwanese authorities, Taiwan

1 has been overwhelmingly successful in controlling
2 the pandemic.

3 (7) The Global Cooperation and Training
4 Framework, a United States-Taiwan-Japan platform
5 for Taiwan to share its expertise with the world, has
6 sponsored nearly 30 workshops since 2015 to share
7 Taiwan’s knowledge on issues such as addressing
8 COVID–19 misinformation, disaster relief, women’s
9 empowerment, and good governance.

10 (8) Section 2(b)(2) of the Taiwan Relations Act
11 (22 U.S.C. 3301(b)(2)) states it is the policy of the
12 United States “to declare that peace and stability in
13 the [Western Pacific] area are in the political, secu-
14 rity, and economic interests of the United States,
15 and are matters of international concern”.

16 (9) The PRC’s recent military activities around
17 Taiwan, including conducting 10 transits and mili-
18 tary exercises near Taiwan since January 2021 and
19 380 sorties into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification
20 Zone in 2020 (the greatest number since 1996),
21 have destabilized Northeast Asia.

22 (10) Increased air and sea activity in and
23 around the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea
24 by the PRC, Taiwan, the United States, and Japan
25 increase the likelihood of accidents that may—

- 1 (A) escalate tensions around Taiwan; and
2 (B) undermine the stability across the Tai-
3 wan Strait and regional peace in the Northeast
4 Asia.

5 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

6 It is the sense of Congress that—

- 7 (1) United States’ engagement with Taiwan
8 should focus on actions, activities, and programs
9 that mutually benefit the United States and Taiwan;
10 (2) the United States should prioritize—
11 (A) people-to-people exchanges;
12 (B) bilateral and multilateral economic co-
13 operation; and
14 (C) assisting Taiwan’s efforts to partici-
15 pate in international institutions;
16 (3) the United States should pursue new en-
17 gagement initiatives with Taiwan, such as—
18 (A) enhancing cooperation on science and
19 technology;
20 (B) joint infrastructure development in
21 third countries;
22 (C) renewable energy and environmental
23 sustainability development; and
24 (D) investment screening coordination;

1 (4) the United States should expand its finan-
2 cial support for the Global Cooperation and Training
3 Framework, and encourage like-minded countries to
4 co-sponsor workshops, to showcase Taiwan's capac-
5 ity to contribute to solving global challenges in the
6 face of the Government of the PRC's campaign to
7 isolate Taiwan in the international community;

8 (5) to advance the goals of the April 2021 De-
9 partment of State guidance expanding unofficial
10 United States-Taiwan contacts, the United States,
11 Taiwan, and Japan should aim to host Global Co-
12 operation and Training Framework workshops timed
13 to coincide with plenaries and other meetings of
14 international organizations in which Taiwan is un-
15 able to participate;

16 (6) the United States should support efforts to
17 engage regional counterparts in Track 1.5 and
18 Track 2 dialogues on the stability across the Taiwan
19 Strait, which are important for increasing strategic
20 awareness amongst all parties and the avoidance of
21 conflict;

22 (7) United States' arms sales to Taiwan should
23 support Taiwan's asymmetric defense capabilities, as
24 outlined in Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept, and
25 improve Taiwan's military deterrent;

1 (8) bilateral confidence-building measures and
2 crisis stability dialogues between the United States
3 and the PRC are important mechanisms for main-
4 taining deterrence and stability across the Taiwan
5 Strait and should be prioritized;

6 (9) the United States and the PRC should
7 prioritize the use of a fully-operational military crisis
8 hotline to provide a mechanism for the leadership of
9 the two countries to communicate directly in order
10 to quickly resolve misunderstandings that could lead
11 to military escalation.

12 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

13 In this Act:

14 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
15 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
16 mittees” means—

17 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
18 the Senate;

19 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of
20 the Senate;

21 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
22 the House of Representatives; and

23 (D) the Committee on Armed Services of
24 the House of Representatives.

1 (2) CHINA; PRC.—The terms “China” and
2 “PRC” mean the People’s Republic of China.

3 (3) TAIWAN AUTHORITIES.—The term “Taiwan
4 authorities” means officials of the Government of
5 Taiwan.

6 **SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE**
7 **GLOBAL COOPERATION AND TRAINING**
8 **FRAMEWORK.**

9 There are authorized to be appropriated for the Glob-
10 al Cooperation and Training Framework under the Eco-
11 nomic Support Fund authorized under section 531 of the
12 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346),
13 \$6,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through
14 2025, which may be expended for trainings and activities
15 that increase Taiwan’s economic and international inte-
16 gration.

17 **SEC. 6. ENHANCING PARTNERSHIP.**

18 (a) NATIONAL GUARD PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
20 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
21 retary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary
22 of State and the appropriate Taiwan authorities,
23 shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
24 sional committees regarding the feasibility and ad-
25 visability of establishing a National Guard partner-

1 ship program between United States National Guard
2 forces and the Armed Forces Reserve Command of
3 Taiwan (referred to in this section as “Taiwan’s Re-
4 serve Command”).

5 (2) OBJECTIVES.—The report required under
6 paragraph (1) shall examine how the establishment
7 of a National Guard partnership program would—

8 (A) advance Taiwan’s Reserve Command’s
9 ability to recruit, train, and equip its forces, in-
10 cluding its ability to require and provide regular
11 individual and collective training to all reserve
12 forces;

13 (B) cultivate relationships among United
14 States and Taiwan reserve forces at the tac-
15 tical, operational, and strategic levels;

16 (C) enhance Taiwan’s ability to respond to
17 humanitarian disasters; and

18 (D) strengthen Taiwan’s ability to defend
19 against outside military aggression.

20 (3) CONTENTS.—The report required under
21 paragraph (1) shall include—

22 (A) a comprehensive assessment of the pol-
23 icy opportunities and drawbacks associated with
24 establishing a National Guard partnership pro-
25 gram;

1 (B) an assessment of any statutory or ad-
2 ministrative barriers to establishing such a pro-
3 gram, including a determination of the feasi-
4 bility and advisability of—

5 (i) modifying existing National Guard
6 partnership authorities; or

7 (ii) establishing new authorities, as
8 appropriate;

9 (C) an evaluation of the capacity of—

10 (i) United States National Guard
11 forces to support such a program; and

12 (ii) Taiwan's Reserve Command forces
13 to absorb such a program;

14 (D) a determination of the most appro-
15 priate entities within the Department of De-
16 fense and Taiwan's Reserve Command to lead
17 such a program; and

18 (E) a determination of additional resources
19 and authorities that may be required to execute
20 such a program.

21 (4) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required
22 under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified, but may
23 include a classified annex if the Secretary of Defense
24 and the Secretary of State determine that the inclu-
25 sion of a classified annex is appropriate.

1 (b) TAIWAN'S ASYMMETRIC DEFENSE STRATEGY.—
2 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
3 of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
4 the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate
5 congressional committees a classified report, with an un-
6 classified summary, assessing the implementation of Tai-
7 wan's asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities
8 identified in Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept.

9 **SEC. 7. SUPPORTING CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES**
10 **AND STABILITY DIALOGUES.**

11 (a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-
13 after, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-
14 retary of Defense, shall submit an unclassified report, with
15 a classified annex, to the appropriate congressional com-
16 mittees that includes—

17 (1) a description of all military-to-military dia-
18 logues and confidence-building measures between the
19 United States and the PRC during the 10-year pe-
20 riod ending on the date of the enactment of this Act;

21 (2) a description of all bilateral and multilateral
22 diplomatic engagements with the PRC in which
23 cross-Strait issues were discussed during such 10-
24 year period, including Track 1.5 and Track 2 dia-
25 logues;

1 (3) a description of the efforts in the year pre-
2 ceding the submission of the report to conduct en-
3 gagements described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and

4 (4) a description of how and why the engage-
5 ments described in paragraphs (1) and (2) have
6 changed in frequency or substance during such 10-
7 year period.

8 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
9 are authorized to be appropriated for the Department of
10 State, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense,
11 no less than \$2,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022
12 through 2025, which shall be used to support existing
13 Track 1.5 and Track 2 strategic dialogues facilitated by
14 independent nonprofit organizations in which participants
15 meet to discuss cross-Strait stability issues.