116	TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION  S.
To	o counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and for other purposes.
	IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr.	MARKEY (for himself and Mr. MERKLEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Ŋ	A BILL To counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and for other purposes.
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1 2	To counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and for other purposes.  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
1 2 3	To counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and for other purposes.  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
1 2 3 4	To counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and for other purposes.  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,  SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.  This Act may be cited as the "Stopping Activities Un-
1 2 3 4 5	To counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and for other purposes.  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,  SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.  This Act may be cited as the "Stopping Activities Underpinning Development In Weapons of Mass Destruction

(1) The People's Republic of China (in this Act

referred to as "China"), became a full-participant of

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the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, committing it to apply a strong presumption of denial in exporting nuclear-related items that a foreign country could divert to a nuclear weapons program.

- (2) China also committed to the United States, in November 2000, to abide by the foundational principles of the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to not "assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300 kilometers)".
- (3) In the 1980s, China secretly sold the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (in this Act referred to as "Saudi Arabia") conventionally armed DF-3A ballistic missiles, and in 2007, reportedly sold Saudi Arabia dual-use capable DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles of a 300 kilometer, 500 kilogram range and payload threshold which should have triggered a denial of sale under the MTCR.
- (4) The 2020 Department of State Report on the Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments found that China "continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile pro-

3 grams of proliferation concern in 2019" and that 1 2 the United States imposed sanctions on nine Chinese 3 entities for covered missile transfers to Iran. 4 (5) A June 5, 2019, press report indicated that 5 China allegedly provided assistance to Saudi Arabia

in the development of a ballistic missile facility, which if confirmed, would violate the purpose of the MTCR and run contrary to the longstanding United States policy priority to prevent weapons of mass de-

10 struction proliferation in the Middle East.

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- (6) The Arms Export and Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 93–329) requires the President to sanction any foreign person or government who knowingly "exports, transfers, or otherwise engages in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology" to a country that does not adhere to the MTCR.
- (7) China concluded two nuclear cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia in 2012 and 2017, respectively, which may facilitate China's bid to build two reactors in Saudi Arabia to generate 2.9 Gigawatt-electric (GWe) of electricity.
- (8) On August 4, 2020, a press report revealed the alleged existence of a previously undisclosed uranium yellowcake extraction facility in Saudi Arabia allegedly constructed with the assistance of China,

1 which if confirmed, would indicate significant 2 progress by Saudi Arabia in developing the early 3 stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that precede uranium enrichment. 4 5 (9) Saudi Arabia's outdated Small Quantities 6 Protocol and its lack of an in force Additional Pro-7 tocol to its International Atomic Energy Agency 8 (IAEA) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement se-9 verely curtails IAEA inspections, which has led the 10 Agency to call upon Saudi Arabia to either rescind 11 or update its Small Quantities Protocol. 12 (10) In May 24, 2018, testimony before the 13 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, Sec-14 retary of State Mike Pompeo said that the United 15 States would insist upon the "gold standard" in any bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation "123" agree-16 17 ment with Saudi Arabia—no in-country enrichment 18 of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium—a stand-19 ard the United States achieved with the United Arab 20 Emirates in their own May 2009 bilateral 123 21 agreement. 22 (11) On March 15, 2018, the Crown Prince of 23 Saudi Arabia, Mohammad bin-Salman, stated that

"if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we would follow

suit as soon as possible," raising questions about

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1	whether a Saudi Arabian nuclear program would re-
2	main exclusively peaceful, particularly in the absence
3	of robust international IAEA safeguards.
4	(12) An August 9, 2019, study by the United
5	Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
6	found that the Saudi Arabia-led military coalition
7	airstrikes in Yemen and its restrictions on the flow
8	of humanitarian assistance to the country, both of
9	which have disproportionately impacted civilians,
10	may be violations of international humanitarian law.
11	SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF POSSIBLE MTCR TRANSFERS
12	TO SAUDI ARABIA.
13	(a) MTCR Transfers.—Not later than 30 days
14	after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
15	shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
16	a written determination, and any documentation to sup-
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	port that determination detailing—
18	port that determination detailing—  (1) whether any foreign person knowingly ex-
18 19	•
	(1) whether any foreign person knowingly ex-
19	(1) whether any foreign person knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of any item
19 20	(1) whether any foreign person knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex
19 20 21	(1) whether any foreign person knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex item with Saudi Arabia in the previous three fiscal
19 20 21 22	(1) whether any foreign person knowingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex item with Saudi Arabia in the previous three fiscal years; and

- 1 4612(b)) against any foreign person who knowingly
- 2 engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item
- 3 or items.
- 4 (b) Waiver.—Notwithstanding any provision of
- 5 paragraphs (3) through (7) of section 11(B)(b) of the Ex-
- 6 port Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)), the
- 7 President may only waive the application of sanctions
- 8 under such section with respect to Saudi Arabia if that
- 9 country is verifiably determined to no longer possess an
- 10 item designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex re-
- 11 ceived in the previous three fiscal years.
- 12 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The determination required
- 13 under subsection (a) shall be unclassified with a classified
- 14 annex.
- 15 SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO
- 16 SAUDI ARABIA IF IT IMPORTS NUCLEAR
- 17 TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT SAFEGUARDS.
- 18 (a) IN GENERAL.—The United States shall not sell,
- 19 transfer, or authorize licenses for export of any item des-
- 20 ignated under Category III, IV, VII, or VIII on the United
- 21 States Munitions List pursuant to section 38(a)(1) of the
- 22 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)) to Saudi
- 23 Arabia, other than ground-based missile defense systems,
- 24 if Saudi Arabia has, in the previous 3 fiscal years—

1	(1) knowingly imported any item classified as
2	"plants for the separation of isotopes of uranium"
3	or "plants for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear
4	reactor fuel elements" under Part 110 of the Nu-
5	clear Regulatory Commission export licensing au-
6	thority; or
7	(2) engaged in nuclear cooperation related to
8	the construction of any nuclear-related fuel cycle fa-
9	cility or activity that has not been notified to the
10	IAEA and would be subject to complementary access
11	if an Additional Protocol was in force.
12	(b) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State may waive the
13	prohibition under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign
14	country if the Secretary submits to the appropriate com-
15	mittees of Congress a written certification that contains
16	a determination, and any relevant documentation on which
17	the determination is based, that Saudi Arabia—
18	(1) has brought into force an Additional Pro-
19	tocol to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agree-
20	ment based on the model described in IAEA
21	INFCIRC/540;
22	(2) has concluded a civilian nuclear cooperation
23	agreement with the United States under section 123
24	of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)
25	or another supplier that prohibits the enrichment of

uranium or separation of plutonium on its own terri-

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2 tory; and 3 (3) has rescinded its Small Quantities Protocol 4 and is not found by the IAEA Board of Governors 5 to be in noncompliance with its Comprehensive Safe-6 guards Agreement. 7 (c) Rule of Construction.—Nothing in this Act 8 shall be construed as superseding the obligation of the President under section 502B(a)(2) or section 620I(a) of 10 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22U.S.C. 2304(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. 2378–1(a)), respectively, to not 11 furnish security assistance to Saudi Arabia or any country 13 if it— 14 (1) engages in a consistent pattern of gross vio-15 lations of internationally recognized human rights; 16 or 17 (2) prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or 18 indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States 19 humanitarian assistance. 20 SEC. 5. MIDDLE EAST NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY. 21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the 22 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 23 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy, in 24 consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, 25 shall provide the appropriate committees of Congress, as

- an appendix to the Report on the Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disar-3 mament Agreements and Commitments, a report on 4 MTCR compliance and the United States Middle East 5 nonproliferation strategy. 6 (b) Elements.—The report required under sub-7 section (a) shall include the following elements: 8 (1) An assessment of China's compliance, in the 9 previous fiscal year, with its November 2000 com-10 mitment to abide by the MTCR and United States 11 diplomatic efforts to address non-compliance. 12 (2) A description of every foreign person that, 13 in the previous fiscal year, engaged in the export, 14 transfer, or trade of MTCR items to a country that 15 is a non-MTCR adherent, and a description of the 16 sanctions the President imposed pursuant to section 17 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 18 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)). 19 (3) A detailed strategy to prevent the prolifera-20 tion of ballistic missile and sensitive nuclear tech-21 nology in the Middle East and North Africa from 22 China and other foreign countries, including the fol-23 lowing elements: 24
  - (A) An assessment of the proliferation risks associated with concluding or renewing a

1	civilian nuclear cooperation "123" agreement
2	with any country in the Middle-East and North
3	Africa and the risks of such if that same equip-
4	ment and technology is sourced from a foreign
5	state.
6	(B) An update on United States bilateral
7	and multilateral diplomatic actions to com-
8	mence negotiations on a Weapons of Mass De-
9	struction Free Zone (WMDFZ) since the 2015
10	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Con-
11	ference.
12	(C) A description of United States Govern-
13	ment efforts to achieve global adherence and
14	compliance with the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
15	MTCR, and the 2002 International Code of
16	Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
17	guidelines.
18	(4) An account of the briefings to the appro-
19	priate committees of Congress in the reporting pe-
20	riod detailing negotiations on any new or renewed ci-
21	vilian nuclear cooperation "123" agreement with any
22	country consistent with the intent of the Atomic En-
23	ergy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.).
24	(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under
25	subsection (a) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

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2	In this Act:
3	(1) Appropriate committees of con-
4	GRESS.—The term "appropriate committees of Con-
5	gress" means—
6	(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
7	the Senate;
8	(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
9	the Senate;
10	(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
11	the House of Representative; and
12	(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
13	the House of Representatives.
14	(2) Foreign Person; Person.—The terms
15	"foreign person" and "'person" mean—
16	(A) a natural person that is an alien;
17	(B) a corporation, business association,
18	partnership, society, trust, or any other non-
19	governmental entity, organization, or group,
20	that is organized under the laws of a foreign
21	country or has its principal place of business in
22	a foreign country;
23	(C) any foreign governmental entity oper-
24	ating as a business enterprise; and

1	(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary
2	of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or
3	(C).
4	(3) MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.—The
5	term "Middle East and North Africa" means those
6	countries that are included in the Area of Responsi-
7	bility of the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
8	Eastern Affairs.