AMENDMENT NO._____

Purpose: To limit the use of funds for the ground-based strategic deterrent program and the W87–1 warhead modification program until the Secretary of Defense provides to the appropriate congressional committees a certification and independent study regarding the technical feasibility of extending the life of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles until at least 2050.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES-117th Cong., 1st Sess.

S.2792

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on ______ and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. MARKEY

Viz:

1 At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:

2 SEC. 1548. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND-

3	BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT PROGRAM
4	AND W87-1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PRO-
5	GRAM.

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

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1 (1) According to the Congressional Budget Of-2 fice, the projected cost to sustain and modernize the 3 United States nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, "is \$1.2 trillion in 2017 dollars over the 2017–2046 period: 4 5 more than \$800 billion to operate and sustain (that 6 is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and about 7 \$400 billion to modernize them". With inflation, the 8 cost rises to \$1,700,000,000,000 and does not in-9 clude the cost of the additional nuclear capabilities 10 proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

(2) Maintaining and updating the current Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles is possible for multiple decades and, according to the Congressional Budget Office, through 2036, this would
cost \$37,000,000,000 less in 2017 dollars than developing and deploying the ground-based strategic
deterrent program.

(3) A public opinion poll conducted from October 12 to 28, 2020, by ReThink Media and the Federation of American Scientists found that only 26
percent of registered voters in the United States preferred replacing the Minuteman III intercontinental
ballistic missile with the ground-based strategic deterrent, as compared to 60 percent of registered vot-

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ers who opposed replacing the Minuteman III mis sile.

3 (b) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—None of the 4 funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 5 available for fiscal year 2022 may be obligated or ex-6 pended for the ground-based strategic deterrent program 7 or the W87–1 warhead modification program until the 8 later of—

9 (1) the date on which the Secretary of Defense 10 submits to the appropriate congressional committees 11 a certification that the operational life of Minuteman 12 III intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be safely 13 extended through at least 2050; and

(2) the date on which the Secretary transmits
to the appropriate congressional committees the report required by paragraph (3) of subsection (c), as
required by paragraph (4) of that subsection.

(c) INDEPENDENT STUDY ON EXTENSION OF MINUTEMAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES.—
(1) INDEPENDENT STUDY.—Not later than 30

days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study on extending the life of Minuteman III
intercontinental ballistic missiles to 2050.

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1	(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The study under
2	paragraph (1) shall include the following:
3	(A) A comparison of the costs through
4	2050 of—
5	(i) extending the life of Minuteman
6	III intercontinental ballistic missiles; and
7	(ii) deploying the ground-based stra-
8	tegic deterrent program.
9	(B) An analysis of opportunities to incor-
10	porate technologies into the Minuteman III
11	intercontinental ballistic missile program as
12	part of a service life extension program that
13	could also be incorporated in the future ground-
14	based strategic deterrent program, including, at
15	a minimum, opportunities to increase the resil-
16	ience against adversary missile defenses.
17	(C) An analysis of the benefits and risks of
18	incorporating sensors and nondestructive test-
19	ing methods and technologies to reduce destruc-
20	tive testing requirements and increase the serv-
21	ice life and number of Minuteman III missiles
22	through 2050.
23	(D) An analysis and validation of the
24	methods used to estimate the operational serv-
25	ice life of Minuteman II and Minuteman III

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1 motors, taking into account the test and launch 2 experience of motors retired after the oper-3 ational service life of such motors in the rocket 4 systems launch program. 5 (E) An analysis of the risks and benefits 6 of alternative methods of estimating the oper-7 ational service life of Minuteman III motors, 8 such as those methods based on fundamental 9 physical and chemical processes and non-10 destructive measurements of individual motor 11 properties. 12 (F) An analysis of risks, benefits, and 13 costs of configuring a Trident II D5 submarine 14 launched ballistic missile for deployment in a 15 Minuteman III silo. 16 (G) An analysis of the impacts of the esti-17 mated service life of the Minuteman III force 18 associated with decreasing the deployed inter-19 continental ballistic missiles delivery vehicle 20 force from 400 to 300. 21 (H) An assessment on the degree to which 22 the Columbia class ballistic missile submarines 23 will possess features that will enhance the cur-24 rent invulnerability of ballistic missile sub-

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1	marines of the United States to future antisub-
2	marine warfare threats.
3	(I) An analysis of the degree to which an
4	extension of the Minuteman III would impact
5	the decision of Russian Federation to target
6	intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United
7	States in a crisis, as compared to proceeding
8	with the ground-based strategic deterrent.
9	(J) A best case estimate of what percent-
10	age of the strategic forces of the United States
11	would survive a counterforce strike from the
12	Russian Federation, broken down by interconti-
13	nental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile sub-
14	marines, and heavy bomber aircraft.
15	(K) The benefits, risks, and costs of rely-
16	ing on the W–78 warhead for either the Min-
17	uteman III or a new ground-based strategic de-
18	terrent missile as compared to proceeding with
19	the W–87 life extension.

(L) The benefits, risks, and costs of add-ing additional launchers or uploading sub-marine-launched ballistic missiles with addi-tional warheads to compensate for a reduced deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United States.

1 (M) An analysis of whether designing and 2 fielding a new intercontinental ballistic missile 3 through at least 2070 is consistent with the ob-4 ligation of the United States under Article VI 5 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-6 clear Weapons done at Washington, London, 7 and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (com-8 monly referred to as the "Nuclear Non-Pro-9 liferation Treaty") to "pursue negotiations in 10 good faith on effective measures relating to ces-11 sation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 12 and to nuclear disarmament". 13 SUBMISSION TO DEPARTMENT OF DE-(3)

14 FENSE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 15 the enactment of this Act, the National Academy of 16 Sciences shall submit to the Secretary a report con-17 taining the findings of the study conducted under 18 paragraph (1).

(4) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than
20 210 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
21 the Secretary shall transmit to the appropriate con22 gressional committees the report required by para23 graph (3), without change.

1	(5) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
2	(3) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
3	include a classified annex.
4	(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees
5	DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate con-
6	gressional committees" means—
7	(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the
8	Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee
9	on Appropriations of the Senate; and
10	(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the
11	Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee
12	on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.